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immoral acts (i.e., violations of obligation) as more objective,
agreed upon by others, and true than beliefs about moral acts
(i.e., fulfillments of obligation; Goodwin & Darley 2012). On
the whole, then, proscriptive obligations appear to have more psy-
chological weight than prescriptive obligations.
It may be possible to reconcile these asymmetries within
Tomasello’s theoretical framework – for example, it may be that
proscriptive obligations entail a greater sense of “we” in their for-
mation and enforcement – but more work will be necessary to
assess these possibilities.
Additionally, the process by which observers judge violations
of obligation and fulfillments of obligation also appears to differ.
For example, immoral, obligation-violating acts tend to elicit more
causal attribution and counterfactual thinking than moral,
obligation-fulfilling acts (Bohner et al. 1998; Bostyn & Roets
2016; Roese & Olson 1997). In addition, although agent inten-
tionality influences the perceived morality and immorality of
both obligation-fulfilling acts and obligation-violating acts, inten-
tionality appears to matter more for evaluating blameworthy acts
than praiseworthy acts (Guglielmo & Malle 2019; Ohtsubo 2007;
Pizarro et al. 2003). For example, both adults and children judge
unintended, obligation-violating “side effects” (of a person’s
actions) to be blameworthy. However, they fail to judge unin-
tended, obligation-upholding side effects to be equally praiseworthy
(Knobe 2003a; 2003b; Leslie et al. 2006). People also more readily
incorporate the magnitude of the consequences of proscriptive obli-
gations than prescriptive obligations into their judgments of the
agent (Gneezy & Epley 2014; Klein & Epley 2014). Together, this
research suggests that judgments of proscriptive obligations incor-
porate factors related to causality, intentionality, and consequences
more than do judgments of prescriptive obligations.
Importantly, research suggests that even young children have
an awareness of this distinction between prescriptive and pro-
scriptive violations. For example, children have been shown to
exhibit better memory for negative, obligation-violating individu-
als than positive, obligation-fulfilling individuals (Barclay &
Lalumiere 2006; Kinzler & Shutts 2008). Additionally, children
as young as 14 months have greater difficulty following do’s
than don’ts (Kochanska et al. 2001). These findings suggest that
these asymmetries do not simply reflect “second step” (sect. 2,
para. 2) differences attributable to culture-specific learning, but
rather emerge at an earlier ontogenetic stage.
These differences in judgments of prescriptive and proscriptive
obligations suggest that there are important nuances to how
developing humans learn about the moral obligations of their
group and culture – and that the processes by which we learn
about, represent, and evaluate prescriptive obligations (e.g., to
obey our elders) may be different from those of proscriptive obli-
gations (e.g., to not harm others).
Additionally, there is also evidence that the relevant weight
accorded to each of these forms of obligation can differ as a func-
tion of the specific context in which they are embedded. For
example, these two broad classes of moral obligation also seem
to operate somewhat distinctly across intergroup boundaries.
This appears to be an important caveat to Tomasello’s claim
that obligation “applies to, and only to, one’s cultural compatri-
ots” (sect. 2.2, para. 2). Whereas we agree that this claim generally
holds true regarding prescriptive obligations (e.g., there is little
expectation that one will help members of cultural outgroups),
proscriptive obligations seem to be more common across inter-
group boundaries (e.g., the obligation not to willingly harm mem-
bers of cultural outgroups).
One apparent example of these asymmetries is the (rapidly
growing) number of public apologies made by leaders of majority
(racial/ethnic, religious, and/or cultural) groups for past injustices
to minority groups – apologies which, almost without exception,
center on violations of proscriptive obligations not to harm, rather
than violations of prescriptive obligations (Blatz et al. 2009; Lazare
2004).
As Tomasello suggests, these cross-group apologies may indi-
cate “an expanded sense of all of humanity as in one’s in-group
moral community” (sect. 2.2, para. 2). However, his account
does not explain these apparent asymmetries in how prescriptive
and proscriptive obligations operate across group boundaries.
We suggest that these prescriptive/proscriptive asymmetries
may offer Tomasello a promising opportunity to refine his theory
of moral obligation. These differences in how observers evaluate
proscriptive and prescriptive obligations suggest that there may
be different forms of obligation, each utilizing distinct psycholog-
ical processes. At the very least, different moral obligations appear
to engender different responses when they are upheld or violated.
What psychologically distinguishes prescriptive obligations from
proscriptive obligations? How could such differences emerge?
For a complete account of the psychology of moral obligations,
these questions ought to be addressed.
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Tomasello strives to understand the underlying psychology
behind the human sense of obligation, but he only addresses a
specific kind of obligation: to other human beings. We argue
that in order to account for the psychological underpinning of
human behavior, one should also consider people’s sense of
commitment to non-human entities, such as ideals, values,
and moral principles.
Tomasello presents a compelling analysis of the motivating force
behind humans’ sense of obligation, focusing on the intersubjec-
tive structure of an obligation. However, obligations are not always
immersed in agreements only between individuals. Occasionally,
they are promises we make to ourselves, our commitments to a
particular ideal of living or a moral value – entities that
Tomasello does not discuss. These two different types of obliga-
tions can together explain individuals’ behavior. If Bob is impu-
dent to Charlie and Alice condemns Bob’s behavior, Alice’s
criticism may derive from her heartfelt commitment to a certain
principle of proper behavior to which she holds everyone account-
able; she does not necessarily think that Bob has a sense of
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obligation to Charlie or anyone else. She holds Bob accountable to
the standard itself, not to other people. Alice cares about the ideal
of proper behavior; therefore, it is important to her that people fol-
low a certain behavioral standard when engaging with others.
The philosopher Harry Frankfurt argued that human behavior is
shaped by the things we care about (Frankfurt 1982). Although eth-
ical considerations regulate our relations with other people (using
moral obligations), we often do not find the requirements of ethics
to be the only things we care about. Even people with a strong sense
of moral obligations to others can care equally about ideals such as
being loyal to a family tradition or can devote themselves to ecolog-
ical principles of fighting climate change (Frankfurt 2006).
Some people find moral obligations to be their most important
obligations, above all other commitments. Others may choose to
intentionally violate a moral obligation to another person not
because there is a stronger moral obligation to which they are
committed, but rather because they consider a certain value,
ideal, or course of action to be more important to them than
meeting the demands of moral obligations to others. Frankfurt’s
work draws our attention to the possibility that a unanimous hier-
archical scale of obligations (where morality is superior to all
other commitments) may not exist. An individual’s sense of obli-
gation to other people as well as to specific values or standards
varies not only between people but also between situations: A per-
son can choose to fulfill his obligation to another individual in
one situation, but in a different circumstance he might choose
to obey his commitment to a certain value or ideal over a
moral obligation to a person.
Frankfurt has addressed this type of commitment as an inte-
gral part of one’s inner identity, which serves as the reason and
motivation for one’s actions. He writes:
A person who cares about something is, as it were, invested in it. He iden-
tifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself
vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether
what he cares about is diminished or enhanced. Thus he concerns himself
with what concerns it, giving particular attention to such things and
directing his behavior accordingly. (Frankfurt 1988, p. 83)
People whose behavior is governed by their commitments to the
ideals they care about rather than by their moral obligations to
others may be considered self-centered or judged as a person
who lacks empathy. However, as Frankfurt has pointed out, the
structure of people’s personality is more complex than a one-
dimensional scale of morality on one end and self-interest on
the other. He argued that persons may feel committed to certain
cultural or religious ideals that derive neither from moral nor ego-
istic considerations and may pursue those nonmoral ideals with-
out considering their own personal goals (Frankfurt 2004).
Even though Frankfurt challenged the widely accepted author-
itative nature of moral obligations, he did not claim that our rela-
tionships with other people or the moral requirements for
maintaining those relationships are not important to us. He
offered the possibility that other types of commitments may
count as heavily or even more heavily with us, and he held that
one should not assume that moral obligations always override
them. For Frankfurt, what guides our behavior is not our moral
or nonmoral obligations per se, but rather our attitude toward
them: how much we care about these obligations and how impor-
tant it is for us to carry them out.
According to Frankfurt, the fact that one cares about a certain
thing is constituted by a complex set of cognitive dispositions, but
he did not account for the interpersonal factors that affect those
dispositions. The role of an individual’s social environment and
group expectations in shaping human behavior is, to some extent,
left out of Frankfurt’s discussion. To fill the lacuna, let us return
to Alice’s disapproval of Bob’s behavior: Even if Alice profoundly
cares about a certain ideal of proper behavior, why should she
hold Bob accountable to the same ideal? What urges her to con-
demn Bob’s acts? Whereas Frankfurt did not engage in this type
of question, Tomasello considers the societal aspects that are
missing from Frankfurt’s account. In Tomasello’s view, the origins
of Alice’s expectations may derive from her view of herself, Bob,
and Charlie, as members of the same cultural group. As such, all
group members are obligated to conform to the group’s ways or, if
not, they must provide an explanation for their deviation. The
object of Alice’s sense of obligation may be a standard rather
than a person, but in any case, her cultural identity and group
affiliation will always play a significant role in the process of cul-
tivating the things she cares about and her attitude toward
transgression.
To conclude, human or non-human entities can be the objects
of our feelings of obligation, and those, in turn, influence and
shape our behavior. My intention in this commentary was to
point toward an enhanced psychological account of humans’
sense of obligation, including the approaches of both Frankfurt
and Tomasello. Each theory portrays only part of the picture;
together, they offer a more comprehensive account of individuals’
feelings of obligation and the objects of those feelings.
Children’s everyday moral
conversation speaks to the
emergence of obligation
Karen Bartsch




For Tomasello’s proposed ontology of the human sense of moral
obligation, observations of early moral language may provide
useful evidence complementary to that afforded by experimental
research. Extant reports of children’s everyday moral talk reveal
patterns of participation and content that accord with the pro-
posal and hint at extensions addressing individual differences.
In his account of the ontogeny of our human sense of moral obli-
gation, Tomasello pinpoints its origin in early joint intentional
action and describes two developments in the preschool years:
the first regarding interpersonal obligation between collaborative
partners and the second regarding norm-based morality within
a cultural group. Tomasello invokes extensive support from clev-
erly designed experimental studies of young children’s behavior
(e.g., Gräfenhain et al. 2009; Rekers et al. 2011), which have the
dual virtues of bypassing young children’s verbal limitations
and facilitating cross-species comparisons. But Tomasello’s
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